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Imperfect 10: Digital Advances and 
Market Impact in Fair Use Analysis 
Britton Payne∗
INTRODUCTION 
Technology allows new markets to emerge, which also 
expands the scope of potential markets.1  Yet, in one court’s 
analysis, this expansion forecloses opportunities for previously fair 
uses to survive renewed fourth factor analysis.2  Will Perfect 103 
choke digital fair use?4
∗ J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2007; B.A., American Studies 
with Theater Studies, Yale University, 1992.  Special thanks to Professors Alan Hartnick 
and Stanley Rothenberg for their insights into the issues, and to Halia Barnes, Melanie 
Costantino and Jack Lambert for their comments and help.  I would also like to thank my 
friends and family, especially Jake. 
 1 For example, when television first aired baseball, the technological advance also 
opened the potential broadcasting market for other sports.  “The first televised sporting 
event was a college baseball game between Columbia and Princeton in 1939, covered by 
one camera providing a point of view along the third base line.” See Stanley J. Baran, 
Sports and Television, THE MUSEUM OF BROADCAST COMMUNICATIONS, 
http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/S/htmlS/sportsandte/sportsandte.htm. 
 2 Compare Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002) with Perfect 10 v. 
Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 3 Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 4 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).  Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use . . . In determining 
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be 
considered shall include . . . (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (emphasis added). 
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It is a truism that the capacity of the computer doubles every 
eighteen months.5  This increasing capacity allows rapid 
emergence of new commercial applications of digital technology.  
With each new use, a myriad of subsequent uses suddenly become 
viable, and the scope of potential markets for digital works 
increases.6  This is particularly true because digital media can 
fluidly move from one technology to another without a decrease in 
quality.  Each realized advancement expands the scope of 
technologically realistic market possibilities.  These theoretical 
markets may be technologically reachable, yet remain 
economically unrealistic.7
But should the legal scope of these potential markets increase 
accordingly?  Fair use, as articulated in 17 U.S.C. § 107, is the 
statutory guideline for balancing the constitutionally granted 
monopoly in creative works with the public good, concerning the 
First Amendment,8 education,9 and the development of 
technology.10  Effect on the market is the most heavily weighted of 
 5 “Over the past half century, the power of computers has doubled every year and a 
half.  This explosion of computer power is known as “Moore’s law,” after Gordon 
Moore, subsequently the chief executive of Intel, who noted its exponential advance in 
the 1960s. . . . [E]very eighteen months engineers have figured out how to halve the size 
of the wires and logic gates from which they are constructed.  Every time the size of the 
basic components of a computer goes down by a factor of two, twice as many of them 
will fit on the same size chip.  The resulting computer is twice as powerful as its 
predecessor of a year and half earlier.” SETH LLOYD, PROGRAMMING THE UNIVERSE 7 
(Knopf 2006). 
 6 For example, when audio digital technology was first shown viable for use in 
telephony in 1937, it also heralded potential markets in music recording, answering 
machines, musical instruments, radio, and even appliance interface. See Steven E. 
Schoenherr, The Digital Revolution, http://history.acusd.edu/gen/recording/digital.html 
(last visited Sept 12, 2006) [hereinafter Schoenherr: Digital Revolution]. 
 7 All of the uses of digital audio technology mentioned supra note 6 came to pass, but 
waited many years between potentiality and commercial realization.  For example, digital 
music recordings in the form of the compact disc were not on the market until 1982, 
some 45 years after digital audio was first presented in the lab. See Schoenherr: Digital 
Revolution, supra note 6.  Digital radio was not commercially realized until 1995. See 
Steven E. Schoenherr, Digital Audio Radio Service (DARS), http://history.acusd.edu/gen/ 
recording/dars.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Schoenherr: Digital Radio]. 
 8 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 9 See, e.g., Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir.1983). 
 10 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). 
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the four fair use factors.11  With the recent decision in Perfect 10 v. 
Google, Inc.,12 that analysis continues a general trend foreclosing 
many findings of fair use.13  Following the reasoning of the 
decision, if there is any present market for the digital content, 
regardless of whether the allegedly infringing use has any present 
or likely negative effect on that market, the often dispositive 
market factor will weigh against a finding of fair use.  The Perfect 
10 court’s thin understanding of markets for digital works led to a 
decision that excessively expands the monopoly granted to creators 
in their works, and threatens technological innovation if adopted 
elsewhere. 
I. FAIR USE FOURTH FACTOR 
A. Folsom v. Marsh 
The market impact of an infringement as the appropriate 
boundary of fair use originated in the 1841 case Folsom v. 
Marsh.14  In the case, the scholar, Mr. Sparks, edited a massive 
work on George Washington.15  In 1840, Charles Upham 
assembled a story of Washington’s life incorporating much of 
Sparks’ work and Washington’s writings.16  Mr. Sparks claimed 
that Upham had infringed his work, which had eight years left in 
copyright.17  In determining whether the copying was justified, 
Justice Story pinned his decision on the totality of the market 
circumstances.18  Justice Story could not find a fair copying if the 
 11 See Harper & Row, Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) 
(noting that the “last factor is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair 
use”). 
 12 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6664 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2006). 
 13 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593 (potentially diminishing derivative fair uses); 
A&M Records Inc. v. Napster Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001) (sharing of files 
is not a fair use). 
 14 See generally 9 F. Cas. 342, (C.C. Mass. 1841); see also Suntrust Bank v. Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 15 Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 345. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 348. 
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purpose of the copying was to supersede the use of the original 
work.19  He laid out the forerunners of what became the four fair 
use factors:20  “If so much is taken, that the value of the original is 
sensibly diminished . . . that is sufficient . . . to constitute a 
piracy.”21  Justice Story’s analysis of the effect of copying on the 
market for the original work has remained a lynchpin of fair use 
analysis to this day.22
The drawback to such an analysis is that a judge’s legal 
determination will hinge on his understanding of the market.  If a 
judge could truly understand the market, he would not be a judge, 
he would be Warren Buffet.  Just as judges acknowledge their lack 
of appropriate expertise in making aesthetic evaluations of a 
work,23 judges should be very careful to fully acknowledge their 
natural shortcomings in evaluating potential technology market 
effects.24  However, this judicially evolved look into the insolvable 
mysteries of the marketplace is now congressionally mandated as a 
part of fair use analysis. 
 19 Id. 
 20 “[L]ook to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of 
the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish 
the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.” Id. 
 21 Id. “[W]hether it is an infringement of the copyright or not. . . .  It is often affected 
by other considerations . . . the importance of it to the sale of the original work.” Id. 
 22 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994).  Justice 
Souter anchored much of his analysis on the effect of the copying work on the market of 
the original. See id. at 590–94.  It was not called fair use until Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. 
Cas. 26 (C.C. Mass. 1869). See WILLIAM PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT 
LAW 6–17 (1985). 
 23 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (Holmes, J.) 
(noting that “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to 
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the 
narrowest and most obvious limits”). 
 24 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2792 (2005) 
(Breyer, J., concurring).  “Judges have no specialized technical ability to answer 
questions about present or future technological feasibility or commercial viability where 
technology professionals, engineers, and venture capitalists themselves may radically 
disagree and where answers may differ depending upon whether one focuses upon the 
time of product development or the time of distribution.” Id. 
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B. 1976 Copyright Act 
Justice Story’s fair use analysis from Folsom v. Marsh25 was 
codified in the 1976 Copyright Act.26  Section 107 of the Act 
declared that the copying of otherwise protected works could be 
considered a fair use.27  Congress was aware of the effect of 
technological change on fair use analysis, and did not intend for 
the factors to be limited to their 1976 meanings.28  The Act calls 
for a court to consider, among other factors, “the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”29  
Although no one factor is determinative,30 courts weigh the fourth 
factor more heavily than the others,31 as “the single most important 
 25 9 F. Cas. 342, (C.C. Mass. 1841). 
 26 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576 (noting that “fair use 
remained exclusively judge-made doctrine until the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, 
in which Justice Story’s summary is discernible”). 
 27 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or 
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies 
for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright.  In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular 
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or  value of the 
copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if 
such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. 
Id. 
 28 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 47 (1976). 
 29 17 U.S.C. §107 (2000). 
 30 Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1530 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
 31 See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Handgun Control Fed’n of Ohio, 15 F.3d 559, 
561 (6th Cir. 1994); Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 201, 214 (D. 
Mass 1986); Amsinck v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1044, 1048 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
PAYNE_FORMATTED_101406 10/14/2006  4:47:43 PM 
284 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. 17:279 
 
 
element of fair use.”32  Although the fourth factor is the focus of 
inquiry, the scope and nature of the markets discussed is elusive. 
C. Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises 
In 1977, President Ford contracted to publish his memoirs with 
Harper & Row, who sublicensed the right to publish pre-
publication excerpts to Time Magazine regarding the pardon of 
President Nixon.33  Prior to Time’s publication, unauthorized 
excerpts on the subject appeared in The Nation Magazine.34  
Because the value of the exclusive right to present the excerpt had 
been destroyed by The Nation’s scoop, Time backed out of the deal 
with Harper & Row, who then sued Nation Enterprises for 
infringement.35  The Second Circuit balanced the fair use factors, 
and found that the use was fair as “news reporting.”36
The Supreme Court rebalanced the factors and reversed,37 
finding that Nation had gone beyond news reporting and arrogated 
the “headline value of its infringement,” a market analysis.38  The 
Court emphasized the “direct effect” of the infringement on the 
market for the work in finding the use not fair.39  The Court 
focused on protecting a copyright holder’s right to realize the 
market value of the ownership of the intellectual property, rather 
than emphasizing the public value of disseminating works as had 
been done in the Second Circuit.40  The Court limited fair use to 
copying that does not “materially impair the marketability of the 
work which is copied.”41  This question of “materially impair” was 
 32 Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). 
 33 Id. at 542. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id at 569. 
 38 Id. at 562.  “The Nation’s [unauthorized] use [of the undisseminated manuscript] had 
not merely the incidental effect but the intended purpose of supplanting the copyright 
holder’s commercially valuable right of first publication.” Id. 
 39 Id. at 567. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 566–67 (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 1.10 [D], at 1-87 (2d Edition 1978)). 
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easily answered by the facts of the case since the use directly 
caused a $12,500 contract to be cancelled.42
D. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 
The Court again addressed the fair use factors head-on in 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc.43  The opinion confirmed that 
fair use was still a thriving doctrine.  The Court considered a rap 
song by 2 Live Crew that had copied the title and some 
recognizable musical elements of the Roy Orbison song “Oh, 
Pretty Woman.”44  In applying the four factors, and discussing the 
nature of parody, the court frequently addressed the impact on the 
market for the work, whether in the form of “market 
substitution,”45 “market harm”46 or “derivative market.”47  
Although there is a possibility that the owner of a song might 
license a parody, such that an unlicensed parody would displace 
the licensed parody’s potential market, the likelihood is illogical 
and affords no protection against an unlicensed parody.48
As the Campbell decision illustrates, in a market analysis, the 
court should carefully consider whether the alleged infringing use 
of protected material will in fact substitute for the market use of 
the original work.  The nature of licensing a parody is only a set of 
factual circumstances that the court considers.  The technical 
realities implicated by copying and their function as an obstacle to 
market displacement is a similar set of factual circumstances 
appropriately considered by the court.  These technical realities 
worthy of consideration pepper the landscape of a hot subject in 
recent copyright litigation, the Internet index. 
 42 Id. at 567. 
 43 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576–77 (1994). 
 44 Id. at 572–73. 
 45 Id. at 580 n.14. 
 46 Id. at 590 n.21. 
 47 Id. at 592. 
 48 Id. (noting that “the law recognizes no derivative market for critical works, including 
parody”). 
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II. MARKET IMPACT OF INDEX MATERIALS 
Digital technology and the Internet have created vast new 
markets for copyrighted content, both in terms of distribution of 
works and the repurposing of works.  One of the uses of the 
Internet that has proven profitable is the business of indexing.  
Because the Internet by nature is vast and unstructured, companies 
like Yahoo! and Google have provided the service of ordering its 
content.  “It is by now a truism that search engines such as Google 
Image Search provide great value to the public.”49
However, questions have been raised about whether these 
indices are referring the user to the content, or providing content in 
and of themselves, on the backs of the original content providers.50  
This is the heart of the fair use question in the case of the Internet 
index. 
A. Kelly v. Arriba Soft 
The market for digital material was tested in Kelly v. Arriba 
Soft.51  Kelly was a photographer who displayed his images on the 
web, on his website, or licensed them to others.52  Arriba Soft ran a 
search engine that returned images rather than text results, in the 
form of “thumbnails.”53  Thumbnails are smaller versions of full 
images, shrunk down to give the viewer a sense of the original 
images.54  By clicking on a thumbnail in the Arriba Soft search 
result, the user then was linked to the full image.55
To create the thumbnails and the index, Arriba Soft developed 
a “web crawler,” a computer program that would search the web 
for images and index their location.56  It would also copy the full-
 49 Perfect 10 v. Google, 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 848–49 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 50 Id. 
 51 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 52 Id. at 815. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 815–17. 
 56 Id. at 815; Wikipedia, Web Crawler, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Webcrawler (last 
visited Sept. 11, 2006).  Kelly refers to a web crawler as a “crawler.” Kelly, 336 F.3d at 
815. 
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sized images, convert them to smaller thumbnails for index 
display, store the thumbnails on the Arriba Soft servers, and then 
delete the full-sized copy.57  When Kelly discovered that his 
photos of the American West were included in the index, he 
brought a copyright infringement claim.58
The court balanced the fair use factors and found that Arriba 
Soft’s creation and display of Kelly’s thumbnails was fair.59  The 
court was particularly persuaded by the fact that the thumbnails did 
not supplant the purpose of the full-sized images, and that there 
was no market for thumbnail images.60  The Court found that the 
thumbnails could not substitute for the full-sized images due to 
technical limitations.61  Ease of access to the licensed works for 
their intended purpose was a touchstone of the court’s analysis.62  
The court found it extremely unlikely that the thumbnails would be 
used for display purposes when the full-sized images are “easily 
accessible from Kelly’s web sites.”63  Kelly suggests a rule where 
relative ease of licensed and unlicensed use will factor into the fair 
use analysis.  This rule, although applicable, went unrecognized in 
a similar subsequent case. 
B. Perfect 10 v. Google 
The analysis of Kelly was followed in Perfect 10 v. Google 
only four years later, but the result effectively reversed its decision.  
Perfect 10 is the publisher of an adult magazine and website, 
featuring photographs of “natural” models who have not had 
cosmetic surgery such as breast implants.64  Google runs a website 
that indexes the web, including sites like perfect10.com, to make 
the Internet more navigable.65  The Google Image search returns 
 57 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 815. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 822. 
 60 See id. at 821–22. 
 61 Id. at 821.  “[B]ecause the thumbnails lose their clarity when enlarged.” Id. 
 62 Id. at 821 n.37. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Perfect 10 v. Google, 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 831–32 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 65 Id. at 832.  “It is by now a truism that search engines such as Google Image Search 
provide great value to the public.” Id. at 848–49.  Especially, “given the exponentially 
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thumbnail versions of the full size images related to the search 
terms that can be found on the linked websites.66  Google does not 
index sites that signal they do not wish to be indexed.67  Google 
indexed some images from perfect10.com, and Perfect 10 sued on 
several copyright and other similar theories.68
In its decision on Perfect 10’s request for preliminary 
injunction against Google, the court leaned on the analysis in Kelly 
v. Arriba Soft to find that creating and displaying thumbnails is not 
fair use.69  Where in Kelly, the court repeatedly found no possible 
market for thumbnail versions of full images, the Perfect 10 court 
acknowledged one that had recently emerged.70  Perfect 10 made a 
deal with Fonestarz Media Limited to sell and distribute reduced-
size images for cell phone screen display.71  The court found that 
in spite of the public benefit, this new market for reduced-size 
images moves Google’s index display of thumbnails out of fair 
use.72
increasing amounts of data on the web, search engines have become essential sources of 
vital information for individuals, governments, non-profits, and businesses who seek to 
locate information.” Id. at *849.  It is worth noting that Google makes profit from 
providing this service by selling advertising space that it displays to its users with its 
innovative use of the search information it gathers. Id. at 834.  Google’s algorithms target 
consumers more effectively than can be done in any other media.  The Times: You are the 
target, THE SEARCH WORKS, Aug. 13, 2006, http://www.thesearchworks.com/news-
read.php?id=460 (last visited Sept. 17, 2006). 
 66 Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 832–33. 
 67 Id. at 832.  “Websites that do not wish to be indexed, or that wish to have only 
certain content indexed, can do so by signaling to Google’s web crawler those parts that 
are ‘off limits.’  Google’s web crawler honors those signals.” Id. 
 68 See id. at 834. 
 69 Id. at 848, 851. 
 70 Compare Kelly v. Arriba Soft, 336 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2003) with Perfect 10, 
416 F. Supp. 2d at 851. 
 71 Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 849.  In his comments following the Perfect 10 
decision, Fred von Lohmann of the Electronic Frontier Foundation noted that he didn’t 
“think the court was adequately sensitive to indications that the [Fonestarz] arrangement 
was a sham concocted for this litigation.” Fred von Lohmann, Perfect 10 v. Google: 
More Smooth Than Crunchy, EFF: DEEP LINKS, Feb. 22, 2006, http://www.eff.org.  
Although his theory may have merit that a factfinder could support, the legal issues 
presented are better addressed here if the validity of the Fonestarz contract is presumed. 
 72 Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 851. 
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The pairing of the cases seems to show the rapid development 
of new markets for copyrighted works, and that the market for 
thumbnails had ripened such that their indexing is no longer within 
the bounds of fair use.  Since technology now allows any image to 
be marketed in thumbnail form for viewing on a cell phone 
screen,73 fair use is foreclosed under the Perfect 10 analysis for 
thumbnails.  The court limited its problem with the thumbnailing 
to instances where users would put images from Google’s search 
on their phones instead of buying images properly licensed by 
Perfect 10. 
However, the court’s examination of the market was 
surprisingly limited, at least as it was detailed in the opinion.  It 
saw the images on Google as essentially the same as the images 
sold for cell phone use.74  Although this is true, it is not the 
complete story.  An examination of how images get onto cell 
phones is in order to more fully understand the market for 
thumbnails. 
In order for any image to get from a computer to a cell phone, 
it must be accessed through a particular program.  Unlike a floppy 
disk or a flash drive, cell phones when hooked into a desktop 
computer cannot simply accept images individually.  They must be 
delivered to the cell phone through a program.  These programs 
reformat the images so they are compatible with the cell phone 
both in size and format.  Such an intermediate program is 
necessary to move a thumbnail image created by Google to a cell 
phone. 
The markets for the original should factor in the delivery of the 
content as well as the display of the content.  Since the market in 
Perfect 10 is the use of the images in cell phones, the court should 
have further inquired as to the method of moving an image from 
the Google Image search result to a cell phone before issuing an 
injunction.  Google’s creation of the thumbnail is only the simplest 
 73 Ask Dave Taylor!, Can I Customize the Idle Screen on my Nokia Cellphone?,  
http://www.askdavetaylor.com/can_i_customize_the_idle_screen_on_my_nokia_cellpho
ne.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2006) (noting that “[y]ou can set any image in your phone’s 
Gallery as wallpaper”). 
 74 Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 849. 
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step in the process of getting an image from a computer to the cell 
phone. 
This process will also likely be facilitated in the future by 
phone technology itself.  Although Fonestarz presently sells 
thumbnails for cell phone download, future phones will likely be 
able to convert full-sized images to the appropriate format all by 
themselves.  In addition, if Google were prevented from displaying 
thumbnails, it could still legally provide links to full-sized images 
that are easily converted to thumbnail size.75  This process is 
simple for a user who would have the expertise of moving a 
Google Image Search result.  If the user does not have the 
expertise to convert images to thumbnails, he probably will not 
have the expertise to move unlicensed pictures to his phone in the 
first place, and will be obliged to use licensed vendors as Perfect 
10 would prefer. 
Perfect 10 was able to make a deal with Fonestarz because of 
the service involved in delivering the content to phones.  This takes 
additional steps beyond the efforts Google undertakes in bringing 
the thumbnails to the user’s desktop computer.76  Any user with a 
bit of technical know-how would be able to convert Perfect 10 
images to a cell phone without paying Perfect 10 a dime.77  It is the 
ease of delivery that the consumer is paying for—the content is 
already available without paying.  It doesn’t make others’ 
infringing behavior acceptable, but it does show that Google’s use 
does not in fact interfere with Perfect 10’s ability to license its 
content to a company that provides the service of moving images 
to a cell phone.  Google does not provide that service, and does not 
substantially interfere with Perfect 10’s market for licensing its 
content to a company that does. 
There is a second issue that goes unexplored in the Perfect 10 
decision.  The first thumbnail Google presents is from an image 
search for the name of Perfect 10 model “Monika Zsibrita,”78 and 
 75 See Taylor, supra note 73. 
 76 See id. 
 77 See id. 
 78 See Petitioner’s Motion For Preliminary Injunction at **23, Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 
2d 828 (No. CV04-9484). 
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is 106 x 150 pixels.79  As a matter of reference, the original image 
this thumbnail condenses is 726 x 1024 pixels.80  An analog 
computer display is approximately 640 x 480 pixels, also known as 
VGA resolution,81 which is considerably smaller than the full 
Zsibrita image.  The present standard for cell phones that play 
video is QVGA resolution,82 which is 320 x 240 pixels.  One of the 
best selling cell phones as of this writing has a much lower screen 
resolution of 176 x 220 pixels.83  However, another has 240 x 240 
pixels.84  This upward trend suggests that cell phone resolutions 
will soon reach the QVGA standard, if not the full VGA 
standard.85  In short order, the market for condensed images to be 
downloaded to cell phones will itself be supplanted by the market 
for full-sized images.  Most importantly, as images on cell phones 
must conform to the pixel dimensions of that particular phone’s 
screen, the thumbnail images that come from a Google Image 
Search will likely have to be reformatted before they may be 
properly displayed on a cell phone.86
For users accessing the Google Image Search through their 
mobile phone, as suggested in the Perfect 10 ruling,87 it seems 
even less likely that the thumbnails will be downloaded for 
 79 See Google Image Search, http://images.google.com/images?hl=en&lr=&q= 
%22monika%20zsibrita%22&sa=N&tab =wi (last visited Sept. 17, 2006).  Right-clicking 
on the second image on the top row and selecting “Properties” displays the dimensions of 
the thumbnail. 
 80 See id.  The dimensions of the full-sized image are indicated below the thumbnail. 
 81 See Wikipedia, Video Graphics Array, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Video_graphics_ 
array (last visited Sept. 17, 2006). 
 82 See Martyn Williams, Tokyo Edge: Designer Cell Phones Debut, PC WORLD, May 
19, 2004, http://www.pcworld.com/article/id.116115.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2006). 
 83 See Motorola MP x 220, http://shopper.cnet.com/Motorola_MPx220/4014-6452_9-
30893927.html?pbrpt=4582&tag=nav.specs. 
 84 The Palm® Treo™ 700w screen resolution is 240x240 pixels. See Palm® Treo™ 
700w Product Features, http://www.palm.com/us/products/smartphones/treo700w/ 
specs.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2006). 
 85 Cf. Wikipedia, Mobile Phone Future Prospects, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_ 
phone (last visited Sep. 10, 2006). 
 86 Cf. Taylor, supra note 73 (explaining that one must “resize or crop [an image] to fit 
the phone screen, and then convert it to a supported image format before transferring it to 
the phone”). 
 87 See Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 851 (C.D. Cal 2006) (noting that 
“mobile users of Google Image Search can download the Google thumbnails at no cost”). 
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display.  The thumbnail image presented on a mobile phone 
Google Image Search is necessarily smaller than the screen, to 
account for the logo, the name of the file, and the navigation 
links.88  The thumbnail presented is, like the thumbnails in Kelly, 
too small to achieve its display purpose.89  The user would likely 
download the full sized image, and the phone itself would likely 
format it.  Neither of these actions implicates Google’s creation of 
a thumbnail in terms of market displacement. 
It simply does not make sense to forbid Google’s use of 
thumbnails, which is considered fair under Kelly,90 in the absence 
of a ready or even potential market for the licensing of thumbnails 
for use as thumbnails.  That the Google-generated thumbnails of 
Perfect 10’s images have the same pixel dimensions as some cell 
phones does not mean they have the same position in the 
marketplace with regard to cell phone use.  The public would be 
better served by a finding that the use is fair.  If Google users are in 
fact using the Image Search to download Perfect 10 thumbnail 
images on their cell phones, it is likely a marginal problem, and at 
least deserves further fact-finding before issuing an injunction.  
Perfect 10 should solve the problem in the marketplace, not the 
courts.  The court’s action here disincentivizes further 
development of delivery systems for cell phone images, and could 
have the effect of tamping down other unforeseen innovations that 
might have been made with thumbnail images. 
This presents a danger to the future of the Internet.  Initially 
freewheeling and anarchic, the Internet is now subject to growing 
restrictions.  Although many of these moves are important, 
especially since the World Wide Web has become an actualized 
system and can handle restrictions without collapsing, those 
restrictions must not foreclose future growth in the system.  A new 
use of the Internet should be given as much time to grow as if it 
was a new technology in and of itself.  The Perfect 10 ruling,91 
 88 See Google Mobile—Image Search, google.com, http://www.google.com/mobile/ 
image_search.html (last visited Sep. 10, 2006). 
 89 Compare id. with Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 944 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 90 See Kelly, 280 F.3d at 938. 
 91 Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (appeal pending). 
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projected outward, will result in terrible inefficiencies that threaten 
to foreclose the unlicensed use of thumbnails in search engines.92  
Index companies would be forced to negotiate with all sites that 
have images.93  Or worse, if there is no practical pricing model, 
image searches will be eliminated entirely under the weight of the 
licensing cost.  The irony is that if the search engine thumbnails 
are held to affect the market for cell phone thumbnails, Perfect 10 
would not be able to offer an exclusive deal to Fonestarz and 
license its images for search thumbnailing, foreclosing an avenue 
for directing traffic to its own website.94
III. EXPANSION AND CONTRACTION OF FAIR USE  
THROUGH THE MARKET FACTOR 
Expansion of Fair Use threatens to disincentivize creation.  
“[T]he rule set forth by the court in [Perfect 10] will have dramatic 
implications for all those who search for digital visual information 
online.”95  Moreover, the reach of decisions like Perfect 10 goes 
beyond image search engines.  If the fair use market factor is not 
only dominant, as demonstrated in Harper & Row, but also 
expansive, as shown in Perfect 10, it may entirely swallow up the 
doctrine in the context of digital works.96  Expansion of the fourth 
 92 By way of analogy, aspects of the film industry have been undermined by industry 
practice of approaching fair use conservatively in practice.  For a full analysis, see Keith 
Aoki, James Boyle & Jennifer Jenkins, TALES FROM THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: BOUND BY 
LAW? (Duke Center for the Study of Public Domain 2006), available at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/cspd/comics/ (last visited Sep. 10, 2006). 
 93 Such a requirement might potentially lead to an ASCAP-style consortium for 
licensing and collecting fees. 
 94 Cf. Kelly. 280 F.3d at 944. 
 95 Br. for Elec. Frontier Found. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee at 1, Perfect 10 
v. Google Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (No. CV04-9484), available at 
http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/Perfect10_v_Google/EFF_amicus_brief.pdf. 
 96 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) 
(recognizing the fourth fair use factor as the most important); Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d 
at 851–54 (extending the court’s fair use analysis to secondary liability considerations 
such as contributory or vicarious infringement). 
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factor to preclude fair use threatens innovation, both by copyright 
holders and infringers.97
A. MGM v. Grokster, Breyer Concurrence 
Justice Breyer’s market remedy analysis in Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Inc. suggests a more holistic 
approach than the rather cursory and formulaic approach of Perfect 
10.98  Although Grokster concerned secondary liability,99 Justice 
Breyer’s insights into the reality of the digital marketplace are 
useful in considering the appropriate analysis for the fair use 
factor.  Content providers like MGM and Disney were troubled by 
the free and unlicensed consumption of their works facilitated by 
the Internet.100  Grokster and Streamcast developed programs that 
allowed users to find each other and share files over the Internet, 
including copyrighted songs and movies.101  The plaintiffs sued, 
and successfully appealed the defendant’s summary judgment 
award to the Supreme Court on the inducement theory of 
secondary liability, largely because the defendants had marketed 
and planned their product for the primary purpose of 
infringement.102
The concurring opinions took opposing positions on how the 
case would have come out absent the affirmative inducing steps 
taken by Grokster and Streamcast.103  Justice Ginsburg felt that the 
circumstances would have required a finding of contributory 
 97 See Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 851 (acknowledging that the court’s ruling “might 
impede the advance of internet technology”). 
 98 Compare Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 
2791–96 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (analyzing the Sony standard in light of current 
and future copyright and technology concerns) with Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 845–
51 (addressing each fair use factor in order). 
 99 See id. at 2770. 
 100 See id. at 2771. 
 101 See id. at 2770–71. 
100 See id. at 2782. 
 103 Compare Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2783 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (finding liability for 
distributing a product used to infringe) with Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2787–88 (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (applying the Sony standard to find substantial and noninfringing uses for the 
Grokster software). 
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copyright infringement absent inducement.104  Her inquiry ended 
with present uses of the software, and did not particularly look to 
the more widespread effect of her suggested holding.105
Alternatively, Justice Breyer offered a look at the totality of 
market circumstances,106 applying the standard he articulated in 
the famous Betamax case, Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc.107  There the Court found no secondary liability for 
the sale of copying equipment “capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses.”108  Whereas Justice Ginsburg limited her 
inquiry to present uses of the Grokster and Streamcast 
technology,109 Justice Breyer’s inquiry was more temporally 
broad, recognizing that “capable” implies a look to the future as 
well as the present.110
In addition, Justice Breyer more fully examined the dangers of 
allowing the behavior by looking at other present market 
factors.111  He suggested that there were several other ways the 
conflict could resolve, other than the potentially chilling finding of 
liability.112  As the majority opinion indicates, there is strong 
secondary liability where there is inducement to infringe.113  There 
are traditional infringement suits against those who illegally 
copy.114  This applies to Perfect 10, where the court held that the 
Google-generated thumbnails infringe Perfect 10’s copyright.115  
In Grokster, Justice Breyer acknowledges the deterrent effect of 
 104 See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2783 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 105 See id. at 2786.  Justice Ginsburg’s total foray into potential uses was brief: “[f]airly 
appraised, the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate, beyond genuine debate, a 
reasonable prospect that substantial or commercially significant noninfringing uses were 
likely to develop over time.” Id. 
 106 See id. at 2788–91 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing future uses, legitimate uses, 
and new technology issues). 
105 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). 
 108 Id. at 442; Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2787 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 109 See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2786 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 110 Id. at 2789 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 111 Id. at 2791. 
 112 See id. at 2794 (noting that “copyright holders at least potentially have other tools 
available to reduce piracy”). 
 113 See id. at 2780. 
 114 See id. at 2794. 
 115 See Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 831 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
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such suits, and how they serve as a “teaching tool” for clarifying 
which activities are infringing, to a measurable effect.116
Justice Breyer also notes that “copyright holders may develop 
new technological devices” to protect their copyrights, including 
digital watermarking, digital fingerprinting, and encryption.117  He 
saliently points out the obvious yet largely unexplored: “advances 
in technology have discouraged unlawful copying by making 
lawful copying cheaper and easier to achieve.”118  In spite of 
courts’ best efforts in cases such as In re Aimster Copyright 
Litigation119 and A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,120 free and 
unlicensed music is still readily downloaded.121  However, the 
emerging availability of superior services that sells licensed music 
for as little as $0.88 per song continues to evolve former infringers 
into customers.122  Similarly, in Perfect 10, one can reason that the 
convenience and features of a licensed delivery system might 
mitigate any negative market impact of Google Image Search 
thumbnails, making the use fair. 
The Ginsberg and Breyer analyses are not quite analogous to 
the Perfect 10 case because the threshold for secondary liability 
differs from the more fluid fair use analysis.123  Still, the scope of 
Breyer’s inquiry into market realities in his Grokster concurrence 
seems to carry out the mandate of fair use analysis laid out in 
Campbell more thoroughly than the Perfect 10 decision 
revealed.124  Conversely, Judge Matz spent just one paragraph 
considering the facts of the thumbnail marketplace, before 
prohibiting Google Image Search’s use of thumbnails on the basis 
of “commonsense.”125  Diligent inquiries beyond first impressions, 
 116 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2794–95 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 117 Id. at 2795. 
 118 Id. (parenthetical omitted). 
 119 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 120 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 121 See David Scharfenberg, In Business: Defying a Music Industry Crackdown, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, at 14WC (noting that “millions still download music illegally”). 
 122 See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2795 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 123 Compare id. at 2776 (laying out theories of secondary liability) with Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576–77 (1994). 
 124 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 (noting that the factors are to be “explored”). 
 125 Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 851 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
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like Breyer’s Grokster concurrence,126 can properly dispel 
commonsense apprehensions.  Justice Breyer’s parting shot 
indicates where he feels such limitations are more appropriately 
raised.  He states “[f]inally, as Sony recognized, the legislative 
option remains available.  Courts are less well suited than 
Congress to the task of accommodating fully the varied 
permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated 
by such new technology.”127
Although Perfect 10 purports to follow Kelly’s holding,128 in 
practice it will provide no comfort under the standard the decision 
articulates.  Any copyright holder may prevent its works from 
being indexed by making a deal with a company like Fonestarz to 
swing the fourth fair use factor firmly to its side.129  The non-legal 
remedies outlined by Justice Breyer may not prove sufficient in 
Perfect 10, but paralleling his logic, “a strong demonstrated need 
for modifying . . . [Kelly] has not yet been shown.”130  Moreover, 
effectively reversing Kelly adds risks to technological innovation 
that are not outweighed by the benefits to protecting Perfect 10’s 
copyrights,131 especially considering the widespread copying of 
Perfect 10’s images beyond Google’s control. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A principled balance is necessary to achieve the Constitutional 
goal of the copyright clause: to promote the progress of science 
and useful arts.  A finer line must be drawn between the form 
works appear in and the reality of their market use.  Breyer’s 
analysis in Grokster shows a judicial willingness to inquire further 
 126 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2787–96 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 127 Id. at 2795 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
431 (1984)). 
 128 Compare Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 845–49 with Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 
F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 129 Cf. Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 849 (because Google’s indexed thumbnails 
matched the size of Perfect 10’s licensed thumbnails, the court found them to be 
consumptive and therefore infringing). 
 130 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2796 (Breyer, J., concurring) (parenthetical omitted). 
 131 Id. 
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into the reality of the marketplace, and recognize courts’ limited 
ability to divine market harm in the absence of undisputed 
evidence or exhaustive analysis.  Such inquiries should be 
undertaken before foreclosing the fair use defense on an Internet 
index.  The Perfect 10 court should have made closer inquiry, and 
should have denied Perfect 10’s motion for preliminary injunction 
against Google. 
 
